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In both Germany and Italy before WWI, populations labelled as Gypsies found 
themselves in a “state of exception” which aimed at their elimination from the 
nation-state by targeting them with policies emanating from the executive. Both 
states adhered to the liberal idea of equality before the law, but used the 
flexibility provided by executive authority to pressure Gypsies to leave the state.  
After WWI, both Germany and Italy were forced to retain “Gypsies” inside the 
state as a result of changing geopolitical circumstances. However, in fascist Italy 
before WWII, executive authorities continued to operate in a “state of 
exception” and ceased adhering to the rule of law, interning Gypsies in 
concentration camps and seeking to eliminate them through forced assimilation. 
In Weimar Germany, legislative policies sought to eliminate Gypsies through 
bringing them inside of the law. The contradiction between increasingly 
racialized notion of Gypsy inassimilability and forced assimilation’s inevitable 
failures certainly laid the groundwork for extreme measures in both places 
during WWII.   
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In the past ten years, Romani scholars seeking to change the field from within 
have challenged old certainties about how to tell the story of Romani diasporic 
life in Europe (Ryder 2019). One of the key shifts accompanying this ongoing 
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debate is the necessity of understanding Romani populations not as perpetual 
victims, but as enmeshed in sets of social and institutional relationships that 
shaped their lives and futures, much as other citizens (or, non-citizens, 
depending on the nation-state) (Marushiakova and Popov 2017). As a non-
Romani scholar, navigating the line between reproducing the notion of the 
Roma as “eternal victims” at the hands of hostile state authorities, and the 
evidence of the historical archives can be challenging. In the case of the 
relatively new nation-states of Germany and Italy at the turn of the 20th century, 
state authorities increasingly controlled populations they labelled as Gypsies, 
significantly limiting their ability to practice their professions and obtain 
citizenship or housing. State institutions in Germany and Italy, especially at the 
executive level, sought to marginalize Gypsy populations at the turn of the 
century, with results that deeply affected the lives of those targeted.1 The 
following analysis, then, is told from the perspective of the state authorities 
themselves: utilizing their sources and points of view. The actions of state 
officials in the early 20th century illuminate the continuities of antiziganist 
policy in liberal, democratic nation-states, whose effects continue to reverberate 
in the Romani community. I have sought to understand how the nationalization 
of the state in both Italy and Germany affected their anti-Gypsy policies at the 
end of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, and how the 
evolution of those policies following the first World War and the interwar 
period built on the late 19th century foundations built by state authorities.   
Following WWI, Germany and Italy both shifted their policies away from 
expulsion as the first option, to a policy that dealt with Gypsies inside of the 
state.  This policy shift was, in large part, due to the increasing power of 
European nation-states to control the borders, making it more and more difficult 
to expel Gypsies over international borders. Germany and Italy turned 
increasingly to punishment models that claimed to force Gypsies to conform to a 
supposed national norm of behavior ascribed to “citizens,” while often offering 
them little opportunity to gain actual citizenship. Concomitantly, the category 
of “Gypsy” became increasingly racialized in the interwar era in both Germany 
and Italy, with the rise of pseudoscientific justifications for their innate 
criminality. The shift is quite significant, as over time, it made it more and more 
difficult for those labeled as Gypsies to pursue their livelihoods within the 
                                                                  
1 I will use the terms Roma/Romani to refer to the ethnic group of diasporic people; I 
will utilize the term Gypsy when referring to the group created by state authorities to 
designate an “other” group living within their borders. 
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nation-state, which reinforced negative stereotypes about Gypsy criminality by 
increasing economic stress on their community. 
 
AGAMBEN, ARENDT, SCOTT:  MODERN NATION-STATES 
A variety of philosophers and historians have noted the potential of liberal 
nation-states, adhering to the rule of law, to pursue arbitrary policies aimed at 
the exclusion of minority populations. The Romani community has consistently 
been a target of such policies since the late 19th century. Hannah Arendt, in 
Origins, retrospectively, pointed to the nation-state system in the interwar 
period as creating the conditions for the destruction of European Jews.  It was 
then, she argued, that the nation overtook the state, and overthrew the 
foundations of European liberalism and equality before the law:  
But insofar as the establishment of nation-states coincided with the 
establishment of constitutional government, they always had represented and 
been based upon the rule of law as against the rule of arbitrary administration 
and despotism.  So that when the precarious balances between nation and state, 
between national interest and legal institutions broke down, the disintegration 
of this form of government and of organization of peoples came about with 
terrifying swiftness (Arendt 1973). 
 
The philosopher Giorgio Agamben differs somewhat with Arendt’s “breakdown” 
theory.  Agamben, starting with Schmitt’s famous “Sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception” (Schmitt and Strong 2006) instead emphasizes that the 
potential for marginalization was intrinsic to the making of modern nation-
states, even before the disruption of WWI, through his use of the concepts of 
homo sacer, “state of exception,” and “bare life”. 
In Roman law, the figure of the homo sacer, or “sacred man,” is he who can be 
killed but not sacrificed.  Key to Agamben’s understanding of this figure is the 
idea that the homo sacer “is simply set outside human jurisdiction without being 
brought into the realm of divine law,” or in other words, is doubly excepted 
both from human law and divine law (Agamben, 1998).  However, the homo 
sacer cannot exist without his assignment to the category by the sovereign 
himself.  The state of exception is where the figure of the homo sacer takes 
shape:  “being-outside, and yet belonging”(Agamben 2005).   
“Bare life,” then, in Agamben’s theory, is the life of the homo sacer living in the 
state of exception:  a life abandoned to the whims of the sovereign power.  “For 
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homo sacer, finally, we are confronted with a residual and irreducible bare life, 
which must be excluded and exposed to a death that no rite and no sacrifice can 
redeem.”(Agamben 2005).  For Agamben, the modern rule of law thus contains a 
critical weakness: executive powers (“the sovereign”) have access to the “state of 
exception” to carry out biopolitical projects. The state of exception is intrinsic to 
the functioning of the nation-state, rather than a “bad choice” made by 
nationalizing states in the interwar period, as Arendt asserts.   
James C. Scott’s arguments about legibility and high modernism intensify the 
ability of states to place groups of residents into a “state of exception.” Increased 
legibility of those inhabiting state boundaries in Germany and Italy led to the 
increased efficacy of biopolitical projects pursued by executive authorities. 
Despite strong resistance from targeted populations like Romani groups, state 
authorities persisted and attempted to create a category including specific 
attributes that supposedly made up the Gypsy, so they could develop “solutions” 
to their supposed problem.  In The Art of NOT Being Governed, Scott touches 
specifically on the case of the Roma, and expands his notions of state legibility 
projects beyond the West, agreeing with Leo Lucassen’s critique that the 
biopolitical control of “high modernism” is not only associated with illiberal 
authoritarianism but with all modern bureaucratic state types (Lucassen 2008). 
His study of Zomia, a hill region of southeast Asia that resisted state legibility 
projects for centuries, has important repercussions for the study of European 
Romani populations.  As part of the process of the development of the modern 
bureaucratic state, states by definition drew a line between those who belonged 
“inside” the state and the “barbarians” who remained outside.  For Scott,  
“the category of the ‘barbarian’ can have no permanent referent apart from 
being ‘beyond the law.’ It simply refers to those who at any given time are made 
to stand for an idea….Barbarians are, then, a state effect; they are inconceivable 
 except as a ‘position’ vis-à-vis the state (Scott 2010). 
 
He argues that by the middle of the twentieth century, remaining outside of the 
bureaucratic state’s legibility schemes had become virtually impossible for 
anyone, including Romani populations.  Both in Italy and Germany, the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries demonstrate how executive level biopolitical projects 
aimed at increasing the legibility of Gypsy populations attempted to make them 
“disappear” from the national community. 
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ITALY:  PRE-WAR TO POST-WAR:  CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES 
Before WWI, executive authorities in Italy had employed a series of 
administrative regulations that categorized Gypsies as stateless outsiders – in 
fact, the concept of “Italian Gypsies” became a veritable oxymoron, if not in 
reality, certainly in rhetoric. Italian authorities accomplished the disappearance 
of “Gypsies” through confiscation of personal documents, administrative 
circulars to the various Italian prefects, the police, and the judiciary, and they 
utilized both national and local authorities to accomplish the “disappearance” of 
Gypsies. In other words, they used the tools of the information state to make 
those they categorized as “Gypsies” invisible (Higgs 2004). In some ways, then, 
at least before WWI, they sought to make Gypsies less legibile by removing their 
claims to belonging.  By the eve of WWII, they had shifted to making Gypsies 
legible, with the same goal of causing them to disappear. 
The “state of exception” was deeply connected with the development of the legal 
system and liberal concern about the equality of citizens under the law. 
Continental European law was based on a civil law tradition that asked judges to 
enforce universally applicable legal codes.  Alessandro Simoni points out that 
this commitment to abiding by constitutionally-established norms and practices 
provided a serious challenge to laws targeting Gypsies (Simoni 2019).  National 
constitutions, which enshrined liberal and universal goals, made creating a 
separate legal category for a single group ideologically challenging.  Legislators 
navigated around this prohibition by passing laws that criminalized unwanted 
behavior, rather than unwanted groups (Simoni 2008). Judges who were sworn 
to uphold the constitution and the civil code often did so in cases involving 
Gypsies; they could and did throw out arrests that stretched the interpretation of 
criminal law. They were not protecting Gypsies as such, but the abstract 
individual shielded by the law. 
For example, liberal France had chosen to pass illiberal laws targeting Gypsies, 
most importantly the 1912 law regulating the carnet anthropometrique for all 
Gypsies and nomads (Zaretsky and Miljanic 2010).  The carnet allowed for the 
control and monitoring of the Gypsy population – its purpose was to marginalize 
Gypsies living within the French state, but to separate them simultaneously 
from the body of the national population. As Martine Kaluszynski points out, 
the action, nominally basing its criteria on residency alone,  
demonstrated the contradictions of a law that sought to injure a group that it 
had great difficulty defining.  For how could one distinguish legally between 
gypsies and other nomads? This distinction was even more difficult given that 
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France  was a country of positive law, which made it impossible to 
introduce a law based on ethnicity (Kaluszynski 2001). 
  
French Gypsies were brought into the legal system of the state, which in turn 
gave them juridical standing as French residents, something that could be used 
to persecute, but also resist the encroachments of the state (About 2009).  British 
laws also tended to criminalize unwanted behavior that in practice, targeted 
Gypsies for exclusion (Mayall 2003). 
Both Germany and Italy, at least before the war, chose to avoid both the British 
and French routes and instead adopted less formalized, “metajuridical” ways to 
exclude Gypsies from the national body, by utilizing the state of exception 
provided for the executive within the criminal codes of both countries, allowing 
for executive intervention in cases affecting “public security” (Fitzpatrick 2015).  
In both states, officials adopted these methods consciously, because of the 
flexibility offered by skirting judicial review, the ability to increase or decrease 
persecution based on public pressure, available funds, or the international 
situation, and the value placed on maintaining the strictures of the Rechtsstaat 
in relatively new states attempting to gain international legitimacy and power.  
In Italy, Italian jurists like Luigi Lucchini, the editor of Rivista Penale, 
responded unfavorably to the French law, saying that it violated the “expression 
of liberty which dominates modern times” and which “absolutely overrides the 
actual need for protection against a class of persons who only may become 
dangerous”(Fitzpatrick 2013).  Lucchini demonstrated a clear reaction against 
the spirit of positivist criminology and the countervailing liberal conviction that 
individuals should be equal under the law. The spirit of liberal universalism, 
combined with the norms of the modern bureaucratic state, kept Italy from 
following positivist jurist Alfredo Capobianco’s advice to create special laws 
against the Gypsies in imitation and support of the French model (Capobianco 
1914). 
For example, before the outbreak of cholera in summer 1910 that led to a mass 
expulsion of Gypsies from Italy, the Austro-Hungarian Ciuron family was 
traveling around Tuscany with valid passports, exhibiting generally “good 
conduct,” which made it difficult for the authorities to arrest and expel them, 
according to the reigning executive instructions of the time.2  Following a 
                                                                  
2 For a fascinating history of the movement of another group with the same family 
name of Ciuron, see: (Sutre 2014). 
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request by the prefect of Tuscany to evict the family from rented land near 
Florence, the family contacted a lawyer who informed the interior ministry in 
Rome that these were coppersmiths who had resided in Italy since 1905, and 
they had a decent income and a farm in Galicia.  Since they were “hardworking 
and honest” they had never been hindered in practicing their profession.   
Now those gentlemen [the Ciurons], in the name of their troupe, declare to the 
illustrious gentleman [minister of the interior] that they will remove their tents 
from Florence by 3 April, and that they will depart, some of them going to 
Crema and Cremona, and others to Rome, to practice their profession, and they 
will not forget to alert the local public security authorities according to the law” 
(Avv. Giuseppe Gregoraci to the Interior Minister, 31 March 1910). 
The strategy worked in the short term, and the family received permission to 
reside in Italy legally.  However, in November 1910, the interior minister sent a 
telegram to the prefect of Rome, instructing him to revoke their residence 
permits. The rest of the Ciuron family residing elsewhere in Italy had already 
been expelled (Ministero dell’Interno to Prefect of Rome, 27 November 2010).  
The cholera outbreak made the executive authorities even more determined to 
deal with the Gypsies outside of the law (La Stampa, 1910). When Italian 
executive authorities were working within the confines provided by the legal 
system, the Ciurons could respond to state repression and persecution by 
consulting a lawyer to protect their interests; once the authorities sought to 
control Gypsies outside of the confines of the law, there was little they could do 
to protect themselves from an arbitrary state of exception.  The example 
illustrates the flexibility provided by executive measures, and the resistance 
avenues open to Gypsies who could use the judicial system as a mode of 
resistance when the executive authorities were unwilling or unable to 
implement executive directives.  
Italian pre-war policy can be summed up by Giovanni Giolitti’s response to 
Tommasso Tittoni’s inquiry regarding Italian participation in a Swiss conference 
on the “Gypsy problem” proposed in 1908: 
in Italy we do not have a class of persons of Italian nationality that one could 
consider as belonging to the category of real-existing and proper Zingari.  There 
are, it is true, a few hundred families who, based on the profession in which 
they are employed (acrobats, wanderers) necessarily lead a nomadic life, but 
those people are of the Italian nationality and they cannot be considered as or 
treated in the same manner as the Zingari, who are people of indeterminate 
origins and nationality. 
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Thus the necessary presupposition for participating in the conference is missing, 
and in fact, the caravans of Zingari which the authorities of Public Security 
must deal with according to their authority, are constituted of foreigners who 
have illegally penetrated the kingdom, despite the vigilance exercised at the 
borders in order to keep them out in accordance with the last part of article 92 
of the current law of Public Security (Direttore Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza 
to Ministero dell’Interno, Rome, 20 August 1909). 
 
Note the clear distinction made between “Gypsies,” who were assumed to be of 
foreign nationality, and Italian nomads, who were, in this categorization, quite 
different.  Participating in the conference, as the foreign minister pointed out, 
would have meant admitting an undesirable “class of persons” into the Italian 
state who Giolitti claimed had not been there before by differentiating “Italian 
nomads” from true “Gypsies.” Since the policy was expulsion for all Gypsies, 
those with Italian citizenship, or at least Italian birth, could not legally be 
expelled with ease, and thus were categorized as Italian nomads, and released 
following detention, arrest, or imprisonment.  The policy outlined here was 
fairly consistent with earlier anti-Gypsy policies:  as early as 1872 Giovanni 
Lanza’s interior ministry issued a circular to the prefects of the kingdom 
remarkably similar to the official policy from 1908: “The zingari are 
vagabonds…they must be punished with jail sentences and expelled from the 
kingdom:  the possession of a regular foreign passport certainly does not subtract 
from the application of the law” (Ministero dell’Interno to the Prefetti del 
Regno, 16 August 1872).  The circular was issued in response to complaints from 
the prefects of northern Italy about caravans of Gypsies traveling around with 
women, children, and animals.  The prefects stated that they were causing a 
distinct threat to public security.  The circular, notably, only seemed to assume 
two definitive characteristics for Gypsies:  foreignness and vagabondage. It 
described the Gypsies in the following manner: “they go around apparently 
explaining dreams and telling fortunes, or other small labors; but in reality they 
live by the fruits of begging, theft and fraud; in the cities they are a burden, in 
the countryside they are dangerous.”  The interior minister DePretis wrote to 
the prefects in 1879, complaining that his earlier orders were not being carried 
out because of lax security at the borders, and he emphasized the importance of 
controlling the population:  “in reality they live, as was stated already in the 
circular from 16 August 1872, from begging, swindling, and theft, and are 
always bothersome and dangerous.”  He asked the prefects to expel, under the 
public security law, any Gypsies who eluded the border guards (Ministero 
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dell’Interno, Direzione generale di pubblica sicurezza to the Prefetti del Regno, 
15 May 1890).  Before the cholera outbreak in 1910, Italian policy was fairly 
clear and consistent (if nearly impossible to implement) and assumed the 
foreignness of all those placed in the category of Gypsy. Strong claims to Italian 
citizenship or nationality, under this imagining, occasionally enabled Romani 
people to disappear into the category of ordinary Italian citizens. 
When a 1910-1911 cholera outbreak in Puglia and later Naples was blamed on 
Russian Gypsies, executive state authorities increased pressure on local officials 
to implement official policy. By then, countries like Austria, Switzerland, and 
France had redoubled their efforts to keep Gypsies out of their borders, and the 
cholera outbreak had raised suspicions of anyone leaving Italy at the time.  Thus, 
both foreign and resident/Italian Gypsies had a difficult time leaving Italy, 
despite the expulsion orders, and executive authorities and the police sent 
Gypsies with claims to Italian birth or nationality to Italian ports, particularly 
Genoa, for transport to destinations abroad like Brazil. Rather than a shift in 
policy, the cholera outbreak meant Italian authorities attempted to enforce the 
earlier circulars more rigorously. The undersecretary of the interior, Calissano, 
issued a circular on August 21, 1910, ordering the prefects to trace the Russian 
caravan’s route and to make suggestions for how to “liberate the territory from 
these caravans” (T. Calissano, Circular no. 99118 to the Prefects of the Kingdom, 
21 August 1910). On August 28, the Interior Minister, Luigi Luzzatti, issued an 
even more strongly worded circular to the Prefects of the Kingdom in which he 
sought to “recall attention…to my firm proposal to liberate Italy from Gypsies 
and to impede their entrance into the kingdom.” The minister required each of 
the prefects to explain what their province was doing to achieve these goals (L. 
Luzzatti, to Prefects of Torino, 28 August 1910). In October of 1910, the 
minister Leonardi from the Office of Public Security in Rome sent a telegram to 
the prefects in Piedmont and Liguria with specific dispositions outlining 
departure points for German and Swiss Gypsies scheduled for expulsion, and 
ordered the sale of most of their property to pay for their internment, evoking 
what the French would codify as part of the 1912 law (Leonardo to Prefetto di 
Torino, 4 October 1910). 
Under this policy, families with strong evidence of Italian nationality, like the 
Roma Levakovich family, who lived in Friuli borderland between Italy and 
Austria-Hungary, were rejected from the Austro-Hungarian border repeatedly, 
until Italian authorities ended up embarking them on a ship to Santos (Brazil), 
which departed on 25 February 1911 (Prefetto di Udine to Ministero 
dell’Interno, Direzione Generale di pubblica sicurezza, 24 August 1911). Liberal 
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immigration policies in South American countries allowed many Italian 
immigrants to purchase land and work farms there during the Italian winter, 
and come back to work the harvest in Italy in the spring (so-called golondrinas). 
Gypsies with claims to Italian nationality existed outside even the category 
created by Italian officials, and created a conundrum in a time of crisis, when 
executive authorities wanted to rid Italy of people who appeared to be Gypsies 
because of sociological traits and/or behaviors.  The tensions created by Italian 
Gypsies during the cholera crisis are key to understanding Italian behavior after 
WWI. 
The few Italian scholars who have researched Gypsies in interwar Italy do not 
always take account of the pre-war situation of Italian Gypsies, which is quite 
understandable given the archival difficulties of researching ANY time period in 
regard to Italian Gypsies, who, as I noted above, have virtually disappeared from 
the Italian archival record due to the nature of their categorization. Paola 
Trevisan has pointed out the continuities in liberal and Italian fascist policy 
(Trevisan 2013, 2017, 2019). She mentions two 1926 circulars which aimed at 
only foreign Gypsies, like the prewar circulars. The wording is strikingly similar 
to that of the 1910 administrative measures:  it requests that the prefects “purge 
the national territory of the presence of Gypsy caravans, who, it would be  
superfluous to remind you, pose a danger in regard to security and public 
hygiene because of their characteristic behaviors” (Guerrazzi 2004). Thus, it 
seems that the creation of a “state of exception” for Gypsies on Italian territory 
continued.  In many cases, those expelled were not accepted by any other 
territory, placing them in the condition of homines sacri, subjected to the 
arbitrary will of the executive.  As Rosa Corbelletto points out, in order to get 
rid of unwanted Gypsies, public security authorities often had to, in the dead of 
night, sneak them over the Austro-Hungarian border, using mountainous, 
treacherous trails, endangering the life of the old, the very young, and the infirm 
(Corbelletto 2008). The prewar model, continued into the 1920s, proved 
unsustainable.  After these long treks, Gypsies would often be caught on the 
other side of the border and returned to Italian territory.  The one advantage of 
this policy for Romani families who had claims to Italian nationality was that 
some were able to assimilate and escape their categorization as Gypsies.  The 
growing apparatus of state control and attempts to bring uncontrolled 
populations under state surveillance mean that informal executive measures, like 
expulsion, worked less well when the receiving states more easily rejected non-
citizens. In his work Tzigari: Vita di un nomade, co-written with Giorgio 
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Ausenda, Giuseppe Levakovich describes the changes in the northeastern 
borderlands following WWI:  
In those years [early 1930s] there were very few ceremonies among the Rom, 
who were forbidden to leave the province [of Buje], like they had during the 
days of the Austro-Hungarian government.  Both the Slovenians and the Italians 
remembered the Austro-Hungarian administration fondly, because before there 
was more work and we were better off.  Often we played a few Austro-
Hungarian marches (Levakovich and Ausenda 1976). 
 
By 1935, Levakovich argued that “greater liberty” for the Roma had come into 
existence, and he moved from Buje to Udine, where there was more money, 
more jobs, and a better horse market for him to practice his trade.  When he 
returned to visit his family in Buje in 1936, he was alerted that he could sign up 
to work building railroads in Ethiopia. Levakovich volunteered, and thus 
received his proper identification papers and Italian citizenship, during the 
fascist regime.  He married his wife formally in a church, so that if he died 
abroad his family would get death benefits.  Levakovich’s changed life, however, 
did not come without a price.  When he is off fighting, he received word from 
his sister in law that in spring of 1938, “on orders from Mussolini, all of the Rom 
that did not have a permanent job had been sent to concentration camps in 
southern Italy, in Teramo, Calabria, or in Sardegna.  My family was sent to 
Mangone in the province of Cosenza.  For me, it was as if I had taken a shot 
from a rifle. It seemed to me to be a terrible betrayal by a government I was 
working for.” The account offered by Levakovich and his co-author, Giorgio 
Ausenda, must be placed in its proper context.  Published in 1975, it was part of 
a wave of “autobiographical” writing by Roma that coincided with a political 
push for greater acceptance in European states.  The narratives, as Paola 
Trevisan points out, are designed to engage a non-Romani audience while 
simultaneously maintaining Levakovich’s unique status as a Romani man. 
Ausenda’s invisible and undisclosed editorial choices, language usage, and 
translation strategies shaped the text for his non-Romani readers, and 
Levakovich also shaped his story to be accessible for a non-Romani audience 
(Trevisan 2009). From Levakovich’s account emerged the carrot and stick 
strategy of the fascist state as it evolved in the 1930s:  get Italian Gypsies to 
“settle” and take up regular work, or intern them in a concentration camp until 
they learned how to be “civilized”(Trevisan 2016).   
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It is important to note the differences from pre-WWI policy. Post WWI Italy 
was at the heart of a changed Europe, and Italy itself experienced a period of 
great instability before Mussolini’s takeover in 1922.  Passport and border 
controls instituted during the war, the rise of new nation states in eastern 
Europe and the Balkans, and the development of “national minority policies” all 
had negative effects on Gypsies, as Levakovich alluded to.  The multinational 
Austro-Hungarian empire was replaced by nationalist governments intent on 
creating homogenous state identities.  The massive population displacement of 
the post-WWI era led to significant restrictions on migration, and the freedom 
of movement laws that had been one of the hallmarks of liberal state building 
were greatly restricted (Irsigler, 2007). Thus, as the fascist state soon realized, 
the old liberal state’s policy of not admitting the existence of Gypsies with claims 
to Italian nationality had become virtually impossible.  Gypsies who had been 
born in Italy, and had claims to Italian nationality, were not just going to leave, 
and backdoor solutions would no longer be sufficient.  Perhaps somewhat 
ironically, the fascist state found itself in the situation the Swiss had been trying 
to prevent in 1908:  having a significant number of stateless Gypsies on their 
territory that they now had to do something about.   
By 1937, argue both Guerazzi and Trevisan, a policy change became necessary.  
The head of the Italian police, Arturo Bocchini, issued three circulars between 
1937 and 1938. In the first circular, he attributes “the most serious crimes by 
innate nature and methods of organization and execution” to Gypsies  
who are easily able to escape the investigations and evidence of the Police 
because they are without a residence or dwelling. In order to stamp out criminal 
activity that is particularly harmful because it occurs in the border areas, the 
dispositions imparted in previous circulars dealing with keeping out and 
expelling foreign Gypsies should hold, however, it is necessary that those 
girovaghi [travelers] of either presumed or definite Italian nationality be 
rounded up as quickly as possible and concentrated  in an appropriate location 
in each province to keep them from moving, adopting the formula for their 
assignment provided by article 181 no. 3 of the law of Public Security, and 
placing them under rigorous controls (Guerrazzi 2004; Trevisan 2017). 
 
Bocchini’s circular highlights much continuity with prewar policies. First, 
Bocchini is careful to reinforce the previous circulars outlining Gypsy policy: all 
foreign gypsies should be kept out or expelled. Second, Bocchini uses an 
administrative circular, not a formal legal procedure, however, under fascism 
the difference between these two is greatly diminished.  Third, Bocchini, like 
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those before him, relies on the provisions of the public security law to justify his 
actions. Fourth, it seems that Bocchini is careful to use the word girovaghi when 
referring to those of Italian nationality – a careful splicing of words that also 
distinguished liberal approaches to Gypsy control.  In Giolitti’s response to the 
foreign minister in 1909, he distinguishes zingari from Italian nomadi, as if to 
assert difference.  It seems to me that while Bocchini in practice seems to admit 
the category of “Gypsies of Italian nationality” (and as I’ll explain below, this is 
widely how the regulations are perceived), he is careful to try to make a 
distinction between girovaghi of Italian nationality and “Gypsies.”  It also seems 
clear that Giuseppe Levakovich’s story about the fate of his family largely 
squares with the changes in Italian policy taking place over the late 1930s.  
Levakovich’s job guarantees him status as an Italian citizen, while his wife and 
children’s unemployment means that they are sent to internment camps 
(Trevisan 2013). 
The shift in Italian policy in 1937 and 1938 is reflected in the newspaper 
coverage of La Stampa, the Torinese newspaper, in those years. La Stampa went 
from being a liberal to a fascist mouthpiece under the ownership of the Agnelli 
brothers. They are one of the few Italian newspapers to have a complete online 
and searchable database, which allowed me to ascertain some interesting peaks 
in publication on Gypsies (see appendix 1).  The first big spike happens in the 
five year increment from 1910-1914, which coincides with the expulsion of 
Gypsies in 1910 and 1911, following the cholera outbreak in Puglia.  The years 
of World War I include a precipitous drop-off in the number of articles 
mentioning Gypsies, and then for the next 15 years the numbers steadily rise, 
peaking in 1930-34, and dropping slightly from 1935-1939.  In the years of the 
Bocchini telegrams, there were 145 articles, almost as many as were in the 5 
years between 1910-1914. Although some of the articles cover films, theater 
pieces, or music, the frequency of those topics in the arts would also lend 
themselves to a general public interest in the “mysterious” world of Gypsies.  
During WWII, mentions of Gypsies again drop, but still only slightly below the 
previous peak of 1910-1914. 
Two series of articles from 1937 and 1938 clearly attest to the interest of the 
reading public and the fascists in general for the “Gypsy question”.  Between 
March and May of 1937, the journalist Paolo Zappa, a foreign correspondent for 
La Stampa and an early and ardent adherent of fascism, published a twelve part 
series entitled “Le Carovane degli eterni erranti” – “The Caravans of the Eternal 
Wanderers.”  Attilio Crepas, another special correspondent for La Stampa, 
published the second series, in five parts, entitled “Bonifiche Umane:  gli zingari, 
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ancorarli al terra” – “Reclaimed Humans:  the Gypsies, anchoring them to the 
land” between January and February of 1938.  
Zappa’s series was focused on “foreign” Gypsies, and he went to Hungary, to the 
“winter camp” of Hungarian Gypsies in the town of Satoralijaujhely.  He 
remained with them there, reporting also from Bucharest, until April, when 
they set out on their spring and summer travels throughout Romania.  Zappa 
styled the articles as a pseudo-anthropological study of the secrets of foreign 
Gypsies, and the articles are usually themed around a single aspect of “Gypsy 
life.” His account clearly racializes the Gypsies, calling them an “unchanged 
race”(Zappa 1937c) asserting that as “primitives, in a super-civilized world, the 
gypsies cannot resist the call of their race”. He asserts that one “hears the call of 
the race, always present because it circulates in them with their blood, always 
insistent because it beats so closely with their heart”(Zappa 1937b). Zappa gives 
the readers details of their “fear of water:  they never wash themselves,” and 
informs the readers that “theft along with begging represents for the gypsies the 
most common industry and the most honorable profession”(Zappa 1937f). Mixed 
with his own ethnographic study, he cites secondary sources to tell the history 
and origins of the Gypsies.  He even has an “adventure” with a Gypsy woman, 
alà Carmen, to satisfy his readers:  after unbuttoning her blouse, he tells us, 
“And, so, I would have fallen into temptation, if a powerful interruption did not 
save me from the edge of the abyss”. The bar owner warned him that the Gypsy 
woman was running an extortion scam with her husband waiting outside (Zappa 
1937a). Zappa’s articles embraced every stereotype that had been circulating 
about Gypsies in modern Italy, including child stealing, musical talent, their lack 
of religion, and their social organization equal to that of “primitive man”(Zappa 
1937d). 
In a piece on Gypsy origins, he discusses the relationship between Jews and 
Gypsies. Quoting Wagenseil, the 17th century anti-Semite, he tries to disprove 
the theory that Gypsies are cousins of the Jews.  He points out that while Jews 
accept society, so that they can come to control it, the Gypsies reject social 
organization altogether.  Unlike Jews who “pretend to have received their law 
from God,” Gypsies have “no doctrine, no faith, no religion”. He argues that 
their complete opposition to one another makes Wagenseil’s assertion 
impossible, and concludes by arguing that the Gypsies “have never, in fact, 
changed”(Zappa 1937e). Zappa’s series is racial pseudoscience at its most 
abhorrent. Zappa’s series reinforces the historiographical consensus that the 
interwar period solidifies the racialized identity of zingari, to a mass reading 
public. As I have argued elsewhere, the growth of a literate public during the 
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early 20th century meant wider circulation of newspapers and a homogenization 
of ideas about Gypsies that “trickled down” from elite sources (Illuzzi 2019). 
Zappa’s approach, however, reflects Italian ambivalence about who could be a 
Gypsy – by clearly positing them as outside of the Italian national body, as 
“exotic” and “dangerous” foreigners. Zappa’s story deals purely with foreign, 
Romanian Gypsies, rather than with the newer category of Gypsies admitted by 
the Bocchini circulars of 1937 and 1938.   
The following year, La Stampa readers encountered another five part series on 
Gypsies. Attilio Crepas, unlike Zappa, focused completely on Italian Gypsies in 
the province of Gorizia.  The “human reclamation of the Gypsies, striving to 
“anchor them to the land” seemed almost completely a world apart from the idea 
that the Gypsies were “unchangeable wanderers” who physically lusted after 
roaming.  The turn from “expelled foreigners” to “dangerous Italians” completed 
at the time of the Bocchini circulars is reflected in the drastic change in tone of 
the Crepas articles (Trevisan 2017). Key to understanding Crepas’ approach were 
the changing geopolitical circumstances of the fascist state: Gorizia was acquired 
by Italy after WWI, and it becomes “a test case for the fascist regime, which 
increasingly emphasized the importance of their Italianization” (Trevisan 2016). 
Crepas’ central argument in the series is that Italian Gypsies in the northeastern 
provinces, by means of a “carrot and stick” approach, could and would be 
civilized by the beneficent fascist regime. Crepas visits the “concentration 
camps” of Gorizia and documents the stories of Gypsies happily settled around 
their new fascist hearths, attending school, and adopting the new camp slogan of 
“work and hope.” When Crepas tries to get a young woman to translate the 
slogan for an older woman in the camp, she responds, “signore, this word [hope] 
doesn’t exist in the language of the Gypsies”(Crepas 1938a). Crepas 
acknowledges the stereotypes outlined by Zappa:  the kidnapping, the theft, the 
wanderlust.  But, he argues, 
The fascist regime will give these squalid creatures of misery born in Italy their 
human dignity, and instead of persecuting them mercilessly, it will assign them 
to a place where they can settle, and provide them a home and employment.  
All in all, they will be anchored to the land.  The State will provide them with 
tools, a little help, a generous fascist allowance for a civil life.  
Also, in certain “democratic” states, the gypsies have been tied to the land.  
Without any concern for their marital status, without aid, without tools.  All 
they get are a few bullets and a ditch (Crepas 1938d). 
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The challenge to the racist narrative of Zappa is clear:  race is by definition 
unchanging, and yet changing Gypsies’ nature was precisely how the fascist 
government portrayed the internment camps.  As Trevisan asserts, the 
increasingly capacity of the 20th century information states necessitated new 
solutions for zingari (Corbelletto 2008; Trevisan 2017).  The Crepas articles 
demonstrated an immediate response to the policy shift outlined by Bocchini. 
Crepas began his series in Innsbruck, where he spoke to the Austrian border 
police just two months before the Anschluss. They supposedly sang the praises 
of the fascist government that solved the problem of the constant back and forth 
border expulsions.  Again, Crepas focused on the failure of the democratic states 
to resolve the problem: “democratic laws, unable to provide for a radical solution 
to the problem, have simply organized an actual clandestine exodus to Austria”. 
Crepas proclaims that 1938 will spell the end of the Gypsies.  He asks “are they a 
people, a race?  No.  Are they a sect?  Not that either.  A religion? Certainly not. 
And so? They are a kingdom” (Crepas 1938b).  The shift from the racialized 
Gypsies of Zappa’s imagination to the vision of assimilation by an all-powerful 
fascist state provides the logical justification for internment of Gypsies in Italy, 
some “accidentally identified as Italian, and others more rarely who actually 
have Italian citizenship”(Crepas 1938d). The solution was in keeping with Scott’s 
ideas about the unprecedented power of the modern state “to realize a project of 
rule that was a mere glint in the eye of its precolonial ancestor” – or even, in this 
case, a glint in the eye of the liberal state (Scott 2010). As Crepas hints 
ominously himself: “the plague that the fascist reclamation is curing needs to be 
cauterized at its cancerous margins.  It is necessary to annihilate the typical 
Gypsy delinquency.”  He describes how the first “cauterization” was quite severe 
– Gypsies in Trieste were tried for their “grave crimes” (it is not clear which 
crimes) and the public minister requested the death penalty.  Instead, they were 
sentenced to life in prison and 158 years for their lesser crimes (Crepas 1938c).  
The supposed carrot of the internment camps which would “assimilate” Gypsies 
to an Italian lifestyle was accompanied by the stick of the severest penalties for 
those who resisted fascist power. 
In the case of interwar Italy, the liberal state of exception was resolved when the 
fascist state itself was transformed into a “state of exception” – to put it in 
Agamben’s terms, the dialectic between auctoritas (the biopolitical authority of 
the sovereign power) and potestas (power that has its roots in the normative 
political system of law) breaks down in the fascist state, and the “duce” becomes 
the embodiment of both power and authority. The need to remain within the 
legal strictures laid down by the liberal stato di diritto as a way to navigate 
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between the sovereignty of the body politic and the literal body of the executive 
authority is destroyed.  Agamben states, “when they [auctoritas and potestas] 
tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of exception, in which they 
are bound and blurred together, becomes the rule, then the juridico-political 
system transforms itself into a killing machine” (Agamben 2005). There is no 
more need to work around or outside of the law in the case of Gypsies, because 
the Italian executive powers, including the police, can act without the 
intermediary functions of the legislative or the judiciary.  While, as Crepas 
asserts, the end of the Gypsies is somewhat of a metaphorical death in Italy, the 
executive powers aimed to eliminate the category which was only first admitted 
to exist under the fascists themselves. In the liberal period, because of the 
location of the “state of exception” outside of the law, the goal was to 
“foreignize” and expel as many Gypsies as possible. However, given changing 
geopolitics, the fascist police authorities admitted the existence of Gypsies who 
had claims to Italian citizenship, and aimed to control and “civilize” as many 
Gypsies as they could through internment. The flexibility so important to the 
liberal system, remained, however, within the totality of the state of exception:  
“In fact, the lack of specific legislation and the consequent absence of criteria to 
enable the definition of who was an ‘Italian Gypsy’ gave the Prefects total liberty 
in deciding who the police measures should apply to. This situation made it even 
more difficult to document persecution, and it has increased the memory lapse 
about the entire event”(Trevisan 2013). The outcome for the Gypsies then, was 
strikingly similar to the outcome in the liberal state, in that they were 
effectively “disappeared” from Italian history, but the fascist state changed the 
positionality of the margin: placing interned Gypsies inside the state, while 
delegitimizing their claims to citizenship, whereas the liberal executive 
attempted to physically push Gypsies outside of the state utilizing the “state of 
exception”. 
 
GERMANY:  CONTINUITIES AND DIFFERENCE 
In the late 19th century, Germany was also becoming a unified nation-state and 
making critical decisions about how to shape state institutions and distribute 
state power. The historiography of Germany and Italy often focuses on their 
“failed liberalism, “but that assumption has been more recently questioned 
(Smith 2008; Carter 2011). Archival sources in Berlin and Bavaria outline an 
expansive state interest in Zigeuner control at the turn of the century:  press 
clippings, various executive circulars, communications between the Bavarian 
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Zigeunerzentrale and various ministries, inter-ministry communications, and 
communications from abroad, all clearly alluded to a vigorous debate about a 
supposed problem in need of control and monitoring (Illuzzi 2014). They also 
demonstrate that, unlike in Italy, German authorities in the 19th century directly 
acknowledged a category of persons designated as Zigeuner who resided 
permanently within the nation-state. In order to rid the nation-state of Gypsies, 
Italy sought to make “Gypsies” disappear, while Germany sought to make them 
more visible (Heuss 2000). Germany and Italy utilized the tools of the 
information state to place Gypsies in a “state of exception” outside of, but tied to, 
the national community.  
Understanding German prewar examples show again the flexibility and the 
deliberateness of the choice to avoid legislative solutions to the Gypsy problem. 
Alfred Dillmann, the Munich chief of police and head of the Ziguenerzentrale 
before WWI, sought, in a 1911 conference with states bordering Germany, to 
establish a Reich center for Gypsy control, based on the model of the Munich 
Zigeunerzentrale, which would provide for coordination and control, 
particularly among the police forces.  Dillmann stated that the conference 
program  
comes from the standpoint that the solution of the Gypsy question cannot be 
undertaken through legislation on the level of the Reich or the individual states, 
but that this goal is best achieved through the creation of a list of unified 
administrative regulations” (Dillmann 1912). 
 
In a footnote, he explained that the attempt to pass a law of exception 
[Ausnahmegesetz] in the Reichstag in 1910 was unnecessary, “even though it 
cannot be debated that the Gypsies, who are on the lowest rung of culture, are 
not ready for the newest phase of development of the German people, freedom 
of movement and free trade”(Dillmann 1912). Passing a law codifying the state 
of exception, in Dillmann’s view, would stabilize the category of Gypsy in a way 
that might enable some Zigeuner to access legal protection, making arbitrary 
executive action more difficult. During discussions at the conference, the 
Prussian representative 
alluded that through a powerful executive Prussia had succeeded in keeping 
Gypsies out; if they entered out of their own free will, they would shortly leave 
of  their own free will. As far as international regulation, his government 
[Prussia]  does not see any advantage; the most important role in the struggle 
against the Gypsies is always the executive [Executive], which in Germany is 
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much stronger than abroad”("Niederschrift über die Besprechung im K.B. 
Staatsministerium des Innern am 18. und 19. Dezember 1911, betreffend die 
Bekämpfung der Zigeunerplage", 1911). 
 
The Prussian official was unequivocal:  a strong executive, like that in Germany, 
could deal much more readily and harshly with Gypsies than other places with 
strong legislative and judicial powers.  The rule of law established in modern 
nation-states, like Italy and Germany, proved to be more of a hindrance than a 
help when dealing with undesirable populations who were not considered part 
of the “national body.”  The stronger the executive, the more able it would be to 
impose a state of exception upon the undesirable populations, thus excising them 
from the nation.  In Germany, decrees from the individual states making up the 
Reich served this purpose, yet, as of 1910, also seemed, at least in the perception 
of officials, to be having little effect, thus necessitating coordination – but not a 
turn to legislative solutions.  However, during the Weimar period this changed 
with the passage of the 1926 Law for the Struggle against Gypsies, Vagrants and 
other Workshy.  The Bavarians were followed by other German states like 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1927) (Irsigler 2007). 
The dissolution of the Italian state into the “state of exception” under Mussolini 
has clear parallels with Germany after 1933, where Gypsies were no longer 
denationalized and expelled as they were under the Kaiserreich, but interned 
and killed.  The pre-war German Gypsy policy outlined above was actually 
similar to Italian fascist Gypsy policy after 1937 in the sense that Germany 
admitted the existence of a resident Gypsies. Because the Kaiserreich, however, 
like liberal Italy, “was a Rechtsstaat characterized by multiple, constitutionally 
delineated sites of sovereign power that were subject to intense and often 
effective forms of political scrutiny and civic pressure,” officials hesitated to 
round up and intern the Gypsies in the same way as the Italian fascist state 
(Fitzpatrick 2013). However, the state did rely on criminalization and the option 
to send recalcitrant Gypsies to the workhouse.  In the case of German Gypsies, 
the strategy was one of denationalization – by confiscating identifying 
documents over time, the Gypsies found it harder and harder to prove their 
German nationality, and ended up in a cycle of expulsion paralleling the Italian 
case. 
Germany’s post WWI history differed in key ways from that of Italy. 
Understanding that history is central to understanding what seems to be a 
radical shift in policy in Germany. Rather than employing the “state of 
SOCIOLOGÍA HISTÓRICA (SH) 
70 
exception” to remain nominally within the law while simultaneously 
marginalizing Gypsy populations outside of the law, the Bavarian state, followed 
by other border areas, passed a Gypsy and Workshy law in 1926. However, the 
Weimar state adhered at least nominally, to the norms of the Rechtsstaat. So, 
how did the choice to bring Gypsies inside the law come about?  Democracy 
itself may have had something to do with it:  public pressure for “law and order” 
after the disorder of the revolutions of 1918-9 and the brush with Eisner’s 
radical socialism, was quite high, and particularly in Bavaria concerns about the 
“Gypsy nuisance” were prominent during the Kaiserreich. Bavaria, before WWI, 
had established the Zigeunerzentrale with aspirations of becoming the Reich 
center for Gypsy control – which was achieved temporarily with the passage of 
the 1926 law.3 In Bavaria, democratic pressure from below and among the 
representatives to the Landtag to finally control the vagrant and Gypsy problem 
were quite popular, and the “strong executive” that allowed police officials like 
Dillmann a relatively free hand in the Kaiserreich were gone.  The executive was 
weak, and the legislative was the strongest expression of power at the time.  The 
“sovereignty” of the state had moved from the body of the Kaiser (auctoritas), to 
the power of the people (potestas), located in the legislature.  The Weimar 
constitution, signed in 1919, stated in article one that the “power of the state 
emanates from the people”. Since “the people” were most closely tied to the 
Landtag, the choice to pass an anti-Gypsy law seemed more plausible than 
before the war.  It actually gave the sovereign power (the legislature) control 
over Gypsies, but brought them inside the state.  While the goal in Bavaria and 
elsewhere was to force Gypsies to settle and increase “legibility,” the 
efficaciousness of the 1926 law (like the 1912 law in France) was doubtful. As 
Herbert Heuss points out, there is no clear evidence that the law was applied in 
a widespread fashion.  Instead, the function of the law was to "implement a 
change in the function of the police.  It was now possible for the police not only 
to prosecute offenders, following the commission of a criminal offence, but also 
to take independent preventative action"(Heuss 2000). For Heuss, the Weimar 
law was not primarily about racial persecution, but instead about larger social 
and economic issues going on during Weimar and the implementation of a 
positivist vision of law enforcement. Anti-Gypsyism became a way to express 
anxiety or the need for order. "For as long as the Weimar republic existed, and 
basic rights were guaranteed under the constitution, Roma were discriminated 
against and ostracised, but their existence as such was not put into 
                                                                  
3 The Reich center for Gypsy control was eventually moved to Berlin and combined 
with the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt in 1938 (Luchterhandt 2000). 
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question"(Heuss 2000). Heuss’s contention is hotly contested among German 
scholars of anti-Ziganism, but lends credence to Scott’s claim that there is little 
content to the category of “barbarian” other than being “outside the law”. 
Hehemann, Schenk, and Zimmermann tend to automatically assume the racist 
underpinnings of the law, which, in turn makes the path to Nazi genocide seem 
much more well-defined (Hohmann 1981; Hehemann 1987; Schenk 1994). The 
law, while tending certainly towards a racialization of Gypsies in general, more 
closely aligns with Heuss’ thesis.  As in Italy, the “racial” categories ascribed to 
Gypsies still admit the assimilability of the Gypsy, even if the consequences of 
assimilation are the disappearance of the “Kingdom” of Gypsies, to use Crepas’ 
term.   
Heuss’s contention seems to be supported in the report offered by the 
Parliamentary Commission tasked with considering the constitutionality of the 
1926 law (Stenographische Berichte zu den Öffentlichen Sitzungen 1925/1926 
Nr. 106-129, 116. Sitzung, 12.5.1926, 1926). In the years before 1926, Bavaria 
and other borderland provinces had passed many administrative restrictions 
against Gypsies:  they could not stay in recreational towns or areas, they were 
not allowed to carry weapons, and they were all fingerprinted, photographed, 
and provided with identification papers that marked their status as Gypsies: a 
clear violation of the Weimar law stating that no one was required to prove 
their identity with particular papers (Irsigler 2007). The Prussian anti-Gypsy 
regulations first promulgated in 1906 were renewed. In large part, these policies 
marked a more intensive continuation of pre-war policies.  Gypsies were outside 
of the law, and outside of the state.  However, as in prewar Germany, executive 
officials were frustrated by their lack of control, and the tendency for Gypsies to 
fight their categorization, orders of expulsion, and criminal convictions. The 
1926 law emerged as a practical solution to the prewar frustration of the 
executive powers. The legislature sought to ensure “peace and stability” in 
visible ways – by removing those who signified “disorder and instability.”  
In seven pages of debate about the law, the word Gypsy is only mentioned at the 
beginning, where it is stated that the concept of Zigeuner was clearly defined by 
“racial science.” There is not a representative in the Landtag who seemed at all 
concerned about the law’s effect on Gypsies. Instead, the main sources of 
contention about the law focused on article 10, which stipulated that  
the workshy older than 16, who are unable to demonstrate evidence of regular 
work or genuine effort at finding work, can, for reasons of public security,  have 
the penalties outlined in Art 8, section 1, paragraph 2 and 3 [can be banned 
from particular kinds of travel, or residence in particular locales for 3 years, or if 
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foreign, could be expelled] or in Article 9, paragraph 1 and 2 [up to two years in 
a work institution or otherwise employed in an institution] applied after they 
have been confined to prison.  The same is also valid, when these persons are 
convicted of robbery, extortion, theft, fraud, recitation of stolen goods, 
pederasty, procuring, pimping, prostitution, gambling, vagabondage, 
delinquency [arbeitscheu] or begging (Stenographische Berichte zu den 
Öffentlichen Sitzungen 1925/1926 Nr. 106-129, 116. Sitzung, 12.5.1926, 1926). 
 
The most prominent concern was over the line dividing the workshy from the 
long term unemployed, and even a worry (on the extreme right) that casual 
workers skipping work to go hunting or fishing might find themselves in a 
workhouse as well.  Essentially, the problem was with the seeming arbitrariness 
of the law:  it was difficult to ascertain who it applied to and why.  How would 
the police distinguish between the unemployed and the workshy? And would 
criminals just emerging from prison end up right back in the workhouse? How 
would they escape a cycle of criminalization?  These concerns were mainly 
raised by members from the SPD and the Communists, but even individual 
members of the conservative Farmers’ party and the National Socialists were 
concerned.  In the end, however, the law passed with minimal changes. 
The key provision of the law lay in its excision of the judiciary from the criminal 
prosecution of the workshy. The move was a direct workaround for prewar 
frustrations on the part of executive authorities and the police, who were 
thwarted in their “legibility” projects by a judiciary who tended, at least 
sometimes, to uphold the strictures of the Rechtsstaat. The law put all of the 
power for control of the workshy in the hands of the police.  The Justice 
Minister, present at the discussion, asserted that they had no problem with the 
constitutionality of the law, and in fact, that the police very much needed the 
power to independently get rid of unwanted people in urban areas.  He argued 
that the Landtag should not wait for the Reich to get its constitutional law and 
criminal code “in order” – that immediate action was necessary (Stenographische 
Berichte zu den Öffentlichen Sitzungen 1925/1926 Nr. 106-129, 116. Sitzung, 
12.5.1926, 1926).  
Aside from the arbitrariness of the law, and its skirting of the judiciary, the SPD 
also objected to the law’s clear restriction on the freedom of movement.  They 
argued that the constitution guaranteed that “every German in every state of the 
Reich [sic] has the same rights and duties as the residents of the individual state 
itself”(Stenographische Berichte zu den Öffentlichen Sitzungen 1925/1926 Nr. 
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106-129, 116. Sitzung, 12.5.1926, 1926).  Allowing the police to determine the 
travel routes for Gypsies and workshy, as well as limiting their access to certain 
locales, constituted a clear violation of this provision.  The Bavarian interior 
minister argued that the constitution did not explicitly forbid restrictions on the 
freedom of movement and that provisions regarding freedom of movement were 
unclear and had led to confusion on the part of the authorities.  The state 
interior minister contended that the law, rather than being arbitrary or 
empowering the police too much, in fact, was designed with the “improvement” 
and “welfare” of the workshy in mind.  Like the concentration camps instituted 
in Gorizia and Trieste in 1938 by Mussolini, this law was intended to “educate” 
the workshy so they could obtain gainful employment. The law is oddly 
consonant with Crepas’ representation of the fascist motivations for the 
concentration camps:  the fascists claimed (falsely) they would make Gypsies 
into productive citizens by providing them the aid and tools to do so, while a 
democratic Germany sought to achieve the same thing, but all they give the 
Gypsies are “a few bullets and a ditch” – in other words, the means to disappear 
(Crepas, 1938d).  The Bavarian law would undoubtedly submit the Gypsies, 
already closely surveilled and submitted to intensive legibility schemes, to more 
or less lifelong confinement in workhouses, unless they decided to leave an 
increasingly unhospitable Germany.  
The Bavarian law illustrated larger issues with the Weimar republic, as Heuss 
asserts.  The Rechtsstaat was under fire as the political, economic, and social 
systems were weak in the wake of the hyperinflation, and the relationship of 
authority constructed in the Kaiserreich broke down, and power shifted to the 
potestas (the legislature), without a countervailing relationship with auctoritas 
(the executive power and/or the judiciary).  In the Bavarian Gypsy law, a clear 
violation of the norms of the Rechtstaat was admissible because the “state of 
exception” was no longer needed:  the Bavarian state would not be checked by a 
higher power and forced to uphold the strictures of the Rechtsstaat.  Even the 
French 1912 law requiring the carnet anthropometrique, while clearly a 
violation of the idea of equality before the law, stopped short of complete police 
control and virtual imprisonment of those it decided were “workshy.”  The 
French law was also relatively ineffective, since Gypsies could use their position 
inside the law and state to resist state intervention. 
Therefore, what occured in post WWI Germany conformed more to an 
Arendtian idea of the interwar breakdown in the relationship between state and 
nation than the Italian case. 
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It would seem that the very undeportability of the stateless person should have 
prevented a government’s expelling him; but since the man without a state was 
‘an anomaly for whom there is no appropriate niche in the framework of the 
general law’ – an outlaw by definition – he was completely at the mercy of the 
police, which itself did not worry too much about committing a few illegal acts 
in order to diminish the country’s burden of indésirables.  In other words, the 
state, insisting on its sovereign right of expulsion, was forced by the illegal 
nature of statelessness into admittedly illegal acts(Arendt 1973). 
 
However, in the case of the Gypsies, the interwar situation can ONLY be 
properly explained by looking at the prewar creation of a “state of exception.”  
The undeportability of the stateless person was created by the “outlaw” status of 
Gypsies before the war.  In the case of Germany, the prewar “illegal acts” she 
refers to were legalized by the legislature.  In Italy, the legalization of the 
previously illegal is symptomatic of the fascist regime in general.  Specific laws 
were not necessary when the state itself became the “state of exception”. 
Viewing post WWI antiziganist policy through its continuities with prewar 
Gypsy control in Germany and Italy place the racialization and marginalization 
of German and Italian Gypsy groups in their proper historical context, and help 
to make sense of the targeting of Gypsies during WWII. However, the liberal 
state policies do much to illuminate policies in the postwar democratic nation-
states. The treatment of Gypsy populations in today’s democratic European 
societies then appears less surprising and as part of a much longer history.  In 
both Germany and Italy, before and after WWI, Gypsies lived a precarious 
situation that defied the legal norms of the Rechtsstaat.  The interwar period, 
given the tumultuous and difficult situation post-war, caused both states to re-
imagine their approach to Gypsy control, in radical ways. Arendt’s 
“undeportability” became a reality, and the solution, while positing Gypsies 
clearly as a racial group, also, at least rhetorically, supported their assimilation in 
the country. The contradiction between a racial notion of inassimilability and 
forced assimilation’s inevitable failures certainly laid the groundwork for 
extreme measures in both places during WWII.  
 
APPENDIX 1: 





ABOUT, I. (2009): "De la libre circulation au contrôle permanent. Les autorités 
françaises face aux mobilités tsiganes transfrontalières, 1860-1930", Cultures 
& Conflits, (76), pp. 15–38. doi:10.4000/conflits.17757. 
AGAMBEN, G. (2005): State of Exception. Primera edición. Traducción de K. 
Attell. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
ARENDT, H. (1973): The Origins of Totalitarianism [Los orígenes del 
totalitarismo]. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
CAPOBIANCO, A. (1914): Il problema di una gente vagabonda in lotta con le 
leggi. Nápoles, Raimondi. 
CARTER, N. (2011): "Rethinking the Italian Liberal State", Bulletin of Italian 
Politics, 3(2), pp. 225–245. 
CORBELLETTO, R. (2008): "Rom e sinti perseguitati nell’Italia fascista", 
L’impegno, XXVII, pp. 76–78. 
CREPAS, A. (1938a): "C’era una volta una zingara bionda…", La Stampa, 3 de 
febrero, p. 2. 
CREPAS, A. (1938b): "Fermateli a qualunque costo", La Stampa, 22 de enero, p. 
2. 
SOCIOLOGÍA HISTÓRICA (SH) 
76 
CREPAS, A. (1938c): "Frantumi del fantastic regno senza frontier e senza 
capitale", La Stampa, 1 de febrero, p. 2. 
CREPAS, A. (1938d): "La donna che si chiamava Amore", La Stampa, 27 de 
enero, p. 2. 
DILLMANN, A. (1912): "Denkschrift über die Bekämpfung der Zigeunerplage", 
Múnich. 
FITZPATRICK, M. P. (2013): "A State of Exception? Mass Expulsions and the 
German Constitutional State, 1871–1914", The Journal of Modern History, 
85(4), pp. 772–800. doi:10.1086/672529. 
FITZPATRICK, M. P. (2015): Purging the Empire: Mass Expulsions in Germany, 
1871-1914. Oxford, Nueva York, Oxford University Press. 
GUERRAZZI, O. (2004): "Il fascismo e gli zingari.", Giornale di storia 
contemporanea, VII(1), pp. 25–43. 
HEHEMANN, R. (1987): Die “Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens” en 
Wilhelminischen Deutschland und in der Weimarer Republik, 1871 - 1933. 
Teilw. zugl., Münster/Westf., Univ., Diss., 1986-1987. 
HEUSS, H. (2000): "Anti-Gypsyism Research:  The Creation of a New Field of 
Study", en Kenrick, D. (ed.) Scholarship and the Gypsy Struggle : 
Commitment in Romani Studies: A Collection of Papers and Poems to 
Celebrate Donald Kenrick’s Seventieth Year. Hertfordshire: Univ of 
Hertfordshire Press, pp. 52–68. 
HIGGS, E. (2004): The Information State in England: The Central Collection of 
Information on Citizens since 1500. Edición 2003. Basingstoke, Hampshire, 
Nueva York, N.Y: Palgrave. 
HOHMANN, J. S. (1981): Geschichte der Zigeunerverfolgung in Deutschland. 
Frankfurt/Main, Nueva York, Campus Verlag. 
ILLUZZI, J. (2014): Gypsies in Germany and Italy, 1861-1914: Lives Outside the 
Law. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Nueva York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
ILLUZZI, J. (2019): "Stories of a Life Together:  Romani groups and the poor in 
turn of the century Italian archival sources", Ricerca Folklorica, 74. 
IRSIGLER, F. (2007): “Faule Verbrecher” - Roma und Sinti in der Weimarer 
Republik. Zur rassistischen Diskriminierung und ihrer praktischen 
Umsetzung. Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag. 
ANTIGITANISMO EN EUROPA 
77 
KALUSZYNSKI, M. (2001): "Republican Identity:  Bertillonage as Government 
Technique", en Caplan, J. y Torpey, J. (eds.) Documenting Individual 
Identity. Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 123–138. 
La Stampa (1910): "«La colera va decrescendo la intensità»", p. 2. 
LEVAKOVICH, G. y AUSENDA, G. (1976): Tzigari: vita di un nomade. Milán. 
LUCASSEN, L. (2008): "Between Hobbes and Locke. Gypsies and the limits of 
the modernization paradigm", Social History, 33(4), pp. 423–441. 
doi:10.1080/03071020802410411. 
LUCHTERHANDT, M. (2000): Der Weg nach Birkenau: Entstehung und Verlauf 
der nationalsozialstischen Verfolgung derZigeuener. Primera edición. 
Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild. 
MARUSHIAKOVA, E. y POPOV, V. (2017): "Rethinking Roma Holocaust: 
Victims or/and Victors", en Buchsbaum, T. M. y Kapralski, S. (eds.) Beyond 
the Roma Holocaust: From Resistance to Mobilisation. Varsovia, TAiWPN 
Universitas, pp. 73–93. Link: 
https://www.academia.edu/35705190/Rethinking_Roma_Holocaust_Victims_
or_and_Victors (Consultado el 23 de septiembre, 2019). 
MAYALL, D. (2003): Gypsy Identities 1500-2000: From Egipcyans and Moon-
men to the Ethnic Romany. Taylor & Francis. 
"Niederschrift über die Besprechung im K.B. Staatsministerium des Innern am 
18. und 19. Dezember 1911, betreffend die Bekämpfung der Zigeunerplage" 
(1911). Munich. 
RYDER, A. R. (2019): "A Game of Thrones: Power struggles and contestation in 
Romani Studies", International Journal of Roma Studies, 1(2), pp. 120–143. 
doi:10.17583/ijrs.2019.4197. 
SCHENK, M. (1994): Rassismus gegen Sinti und Roma: zur Kontinuität d. 
Zigeunerverfolgung innerhalb d. deutschen Gesellschaft von d. Weimarer 
Republik bis in d. Gegenwart. Frácfort del Meno [u.a.]: Zugl., Wuppertal, 
Univ., Diss., 1994 (Studien zur Tsiganologie und Folkloristik, 
ARRAY(0x558786140c80). 
SCHMITT, C. y STRONG, T. B. (2006): Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty. Primera edición. Traducción de G. Schwab. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
SOCIOLOGÍA HISTÓRICA (SH) 
78 
SCOTT, J. C. (2010): The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of 
Upland Southeast Asia. Edición en Yale Agrarian Studies Series, New Haven 
y Londres, Yale University Press. 
SIMONI, A. (2008): "Sicurezza, legalità e lo spettro degli “zingari”", Reset, 107. 
SIMONI, A. (2019): Rom, antiziganismo e cultura giuridica. Prospettive di 
analisi. CISU. 
SMITH, H. W. (2008): "When the Sonderweg Debate Left Us", German Studies 
Review, 31(2), pp. 225–240. 
Stenographische Berichte zu den Öffentlichen Sitzungen 1925/1926 Nr. 106-129, 
116.  
Sitzung, 12.5.1926 (1926), pp. 450–457. Acceso en: http://geschichte.digitale-
sammlungen.de/landtag1919/. 
SUTRE, A. (2014): "“They give a history of wandering over the world;”. A 
Romani clan’s transnational movement in the early 20th century" 2/2014, pp. 
471-498.", Quaderni Storici, 2, pp. 471–498. 
TREVISAN, P. (2009): "Écrire pour qui ?", Etudes Tsiganes, n° 37(1), pp. 90–109. 
TREVISAN, P. (2013): "The internment of Italian Sinti in the province of 
Modena during fascism: From ethnographic to archival research", Romani 
Studies, 23(2), pp. 139–160. doi:10.3828/rs.2013.8. 
TREVISAN, P. (2016): "Le politiche ‹antizingari› del regime fascista nelle 
province del confine nord-orientale: analisi e prospettive di ricerca", Archivio 
Trentino, 2, pp. 175–200. 
TREVISAN, P. (2017): "“Gypsies” in Fascist Italy: from expelled foreigners to 
dangerous Italians", Social History, 42(3), pp. 342–364. 
doi:10.1080/03071022.2017.1327643. 
TREVISAN, P. (2019): "The persecution of Rom and Sinti in Fascist Italy", 
Trauma and Memory, 6(3), pp. 48–55. doi:10.12869/TM2018-3-02. 
ZAPPA, P. (1937a): "Il frutto proibito", La Stampa, 4 de mayo, p. 3. 
ZAPPA, P. (1937b): "Il richiamo della razza", La Stampa, 9 de mayo, p. 3. 
ZAPPA, P. (1937c): "Incontro con la madre della tribù", La Stampa, 16 de abril, 
p. 3. 
ANTIGITANISMO EN EUROPA 
79 
ZAPPA, P. (1937d): "L’ideale di ogni zingara dal marito", La Stampa, 8 de abril, 
p. 3. 
ZAPPA, P. (1937e): "Origine degli Zingari", La Stampa, 13 de abril, p. 3. 
ZAPPA, P. (1937f): "Ospitalità gitana", La Stampa, 3 de abril. 
ZARETSKY, R. y MILJANIC, O. (2010): "France and the Gypsies, Then and 
Now", The New York Times, 6 de septiembre. Link: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/opinion/07iht-edzaretsky.html 
(Consultado el 3 de octubre, 2019). 
 
ARCHIVAL SOURCES (IN ORDER OF CITATION) 
Letter from Avv. Giuseppe Gregoraci to the Interior Minister, Rome, 31 March 
1910, Archivio Centrale di Stato Roma (ACdSR) Ministero dell’Interno 12100.14, 
Polizia Giudiziaria, 1910-1912, busta 309. 
Telegram from Ministero dell’Interno to the Prefect of Rome, 27 November 
1910, ACdSR Ministero dell’Interno 12100.14, Polizia Giudiziaria, 1910-1912, 
busta 309. 
Direttore Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza to Ministero dell’Interno, Rome, 20 
August 1909, ACdSR, Ministero Interno Direzione Generale “Pubblica 
Sicurezza”  Divisione Polizia Giudiziaria: 1910-1912,12100.14, busta 304.  
Telegram from Ministero dell’Interno to the Prefetti del Regno, 16 August 1872, 
Archivio di Stato Torino, Via Piave (AdSTP), Prefettura di Torino Gabinetto: 
Categoria Massime Affari Vari 1871-1929, 640/1. 
Telegram from Interior Minister, General Director of Pubblica Sicurezza, Rome, 
to the Prefects of the Kingdom, 15 May 1890, ACdSR, Ministero dell’Interno, 
Polizia Giudiziaria, 1910-1912/12100.14, Busta 304:  earlier telegrams attached. 
T. Calissano, Circular no 99118 to the Prefects of the Kingdom, 21 August 1910, 
AdSTP, Prefettura di Torino, Gabinetto, Cat. Massime Affari Vari 1871-1929, 
Busta 640/1. 
L. Luzzatti, Telegram received 26 August 1910 in Torino, AdSTP, Prefettura di 
Torino, Gabinetto, Cat. Massime Affari Vari 1871-1929, Busta 640/1. 
Leonardo, Telegram from Rome, Divisione di PS (n. 12100.14) received 4 
October 1910  in Torino, AdSTP, Prefettura di Torino, Gabinetto, Cat. Massime 
Affari Vari 1871-1929, Busta 640/1. 
SOCIOLOGÍA HISTÓRICA (SH) 
80 
Leonardo, Telegram from Rome, Divisione di PS (n. 12100.14) received 4 
October 1910  in Torino, AdSTP, Prefettura di Torino, Gabinetto, Cat. Massime 
Affari Vari 1871-1929, Busta 640/1. 
Prefect of Udine to the Ministero dell’Interno, Direzione Generale di PS, 24 
August 1911, ACdSR Ministero dell’Interno 12100.14, Polizia Giudiziaria, 1910-




Recibido: 12 de noviembre de 2019  







Jennifer Illuzzi is Associate Professor of History at Providence College, USA. 
She  researches the intersections of institutional power and Romani marginality 
in Germany and Italy as well as European gender history.  Her publications 
include Gypsies in Germany and Italy 1861-1914:  Lives Outside the Law 
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), “Stories of a Life Together:  Romani groups and the 
poor in turn of the century Italian archival sources” (Ricerca Folklorica, 2019), 
and “Reimagining the Nation: Gendered Images of Italy and the Italo‐Turkish 
War of 1911–12” (Gender and History, 2018). Jilluzz1@providence.edu 
